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Considered as a whole, the cases involving "personal" at.d "inherent"
defenses show no strong policy either in favor or against the surety; nor can
it be said under most circumstances that the business content of the surety-
ship idea is so clear as to make one bias more consistent with usage than
another. The fact is that no one knows against what risks sureties in general
are supposed to protect creditors. Careful lawyers can build persuasive
records pointing to the desired construction of the contract in issue, but
there seems no basis either in law or *in business to support a generalized
theory of the uncompensated surety's risks, and no reason to look for one,
with the apparatus of simple contract analysis ready at hand to deal with
individual bargains as they are litigated.
DECLARATORY DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW
PERSON S threatened with prosecution. under criininal legislation1 or under
the numerous quasi-criminal statutes which attempt to enforce regulatory
measures through forfeitures or penalties 2 have found the declaratory judg-
ment a convenient method, under certain circumstances, for adjudicating
their rights before being prosecuted. Lately, however, some decisions indi-
cate that the operation of the declaratory judgment may be so circumscribed
by rules which limit the use of the injunction in criminal or quasi-criminal
cases as to reduce the utility of the declaratory judgment as a procedural
reform. 3 Two recent New York cases are illustrative. The first of these
1. Multnomah County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, 140 Ore. 172, 13 Pac. (2d) 354
(1932); Lagoon jockey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 270 Pac. 543 (1928);
Harcourt v. Attorney-General [1923] N. Z. 686.
2. Sage-Allen Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 607, 179 At. 195 (1935); State
v. Grove. 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921); Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac.
959 (1927); Ware v. Ammon, 212 Ky. 152, 278 S. ,V. 593 (1925); Faulkner -. City
of Keene. 85 N.H. 147, 155 At. 195 (1931); Chung Mee Restaurant Co. v. Healy.
86 N. H. 483, 171 Atl. 263 (1934); Tirrell v. Johnston, 86 N. H. 530, 171 AtI. 641
(1934); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y.
Supp. 288 (1st Dep't 1936); American Trust Co. v. McCallister, 136 Ore. 338. 299
Pac. 319 (1931); Huber v. Weakland. 7 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 496 (1925); Lindsey
v. Drane, 154 Tenn. 458, 285 S. W. 705 (1926); Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278,
300 S. V. 565 (1927); State v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N. V. 486 (1935); Dyson
v. Attorney-General [1912], 1 Ch. 158; Minister of Customs v. McParland, 29 N. Z.
279 (1909); Grubner v. Wright, [1921] N. Z. 394. See also Path6 Exchange, Inc. v.
Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (3d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539,
142 N. E. 274 (1923) (submission of a controversy on an agreed statement of facts
pursuant to N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 546). See BoRCnARD, DECLAIATORY JUDGi'I NTS
(1934) 562-3.
3. It has been argued that the declaratory judgment is simply a minor pleading
reform because it adds little to what without it could be accomplished through an in-
junction. See Arnold, Trial By Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 HAv. L. Ray.
913, 926.
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was an action against the police commissioner of New York City, in which
the manufacturer of a special type of slot machine petitioned for a declara-
tory judgment holding that his machines neither were nor could he con-
verted into gambling devices in violation of a state penal law, and for an
injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with these machines.
The trial court, although refusing the injunction, granted declaratory relief,4
but was reversed by the Appellate Division on the ground that a declaratory
judgment should not be given where, as here, its use would circumvent the
rule that equity will not, except under most unusual circumstances, enjoin
the enforcement of a valid criminal statute.5 This result was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion holding the declaratory judg-
ment not an appropriate remedy.6 In the second case an action was brought
against the police of Garden City to determine by declaratory judgment
whether the plaintiff's system of dog racing violated the state penal law.
The trial court declared the system legal,7 but the Appellate Division reversed,
refusing to grant declaratory relief, first because it was improper for a civil
court to decide whether the scleme was in violation of the penal law, and
second, because a civil court's ruling on a question of the plaintiff's guilt or
innocence could have no binding effect, such questions being reserved for
the exclusive determination of criminal courts.s
The implication of these decisions is that the New York courts intend
to regard the declaratory judgment as alternative to injunctive relief in
criminal cases, and to include it within* the scope of their policy against
This charge has been vigorously denied. See Borchard in note 21 in Arnold, Trial
By Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 913, 927. And in several
recent cases declaratory judgments have been granted although injunctions have been
refused. F. G. Vogt & Sons, Inc. v. Rothensies, 11 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. Pa. 1935);
Penn v. Glenn, 10 F. Supp. 483 (W. D. Ky. 1935); Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp, 867
(E. D. Mich. 1934) ; Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Gully, 8 F. Snpp. 174 (S. D. Miss.
1934); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City oi New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y.
Supp. 288 (Ist Dep't 1936) ; Associated Industries v. Department of Labor, 158 Misc.
350, 286 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Lindsey v. Drane, 154 Tenn. 458, 285 S. W.
705 (1926).
4. International Mutoscope Reel Co. v. Valentine, 247 App. Div. 130, 132, 286
N. Y. Supp. 806, 807-808 (1st Dep't 1936) (summarizing unreported decision of trial
court).
5. International Mutoscope Reel Co. v. Valentine, 247 App. Div. 130, 286 N. Y.
Supp. 806 (Ist Dep't 1936).
6. International Mutoscope Reel Co. v. Valentine, 271 N. Y. 622, 3 N. E. (2d)
453 (1936).
7. Reed v. Littleton, 159 Misc. 853, 289 N. Y. Supp. 798 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
8. Reed v. Littleton, 292 N. Y. Supp. 363 (2nd Dep't 1936). For a criticism of
this holding see Borchard, Letter to Editor in N. Y. L. J., Feb. 5, 1937, p. 620, col, 3.
It is to be noted that in neither of the instant cases had the threatened criminal
prosecutions actually been instituted. And in the subsequent discussion the assumption
is that no such action has been brought. Were it otherwise, a civil court would doubt-
less decline to interfere with a criminal court's jurisdiction.
[Vol. 46 : 855
1937] DECLARATORY DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW 857
equity decisions on questions of criminal law.9 Such an extension of the
rule seems to require a reconsideration of the policy underlying it.I
It is often asserted that equity will not interfere with the enforcement of a
criminal law by enjoining the police from prosecuting defendants for activi-
ties which they, as petitioners in equity before the prosecution has begun,
allege are not illegal. 1 Although many injunctions have been denied by the
application of this formula, the various exceptions which have been developed
indicate that strict compliance with the general rule would have produced
results thought to be too rigorous.12 Injunctions have been issued to restrain
impending prosecutions which threaten "irreparable" injury to property
rights if unfounded.' 3 The same result follows where a number of vexatious
criminal prosecutions impend 14 or where statutory penalties are so formid-
able as to deter a person subject to them from risking a criminal prosecution
to test the validity of a statuteY5
Several rationalizations have been advanced to support the denial of in-
junctions against the enforcement of the criminal law. The less persuasive
among them are that the issuance of an injunction would permit the state
9. Other cases reveal the same tendency: Bradley Lumber Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C.A. 5th, 1936); Lyttle v. Valentine, 160
Misc. 355, 290 N. Y. Supp. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
10. It is beyond the scope of this comment to consider whether a distinction should
be drawn between actions to test a statute's constitutionality and actions merely to
determine its applicability. Some have argued that extra-legal considerations render
it desirable to differentiate between the two cases. Those taking this position urge that
the difficulty of access to the courts in constitutional cases should be maximized in order
to delay judicial decisions on statutes until their operation affords sufficient experience
by which to judge their social feasibility or inutility. See Note (1932) 45 H~Av. L.
Rv. 1089; Shulman. Book Review (1937) 46 YALE L. J., 724, 726.
Others have as vigorously argued that especially in the field of public law it is
socially desirable to protect individuals from oppressive legislation by as speedy an
adjudication of their constitutional rights as possible. See Borchard. Comment (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 1195. For presentation of buth viewpnints, see Comment (1936) 46 YALE
L. J. 255, 268-272.
W,\here the legislature deems it desirable, the right to a declaratory judgment may
be withdrawn, as in the case of federal taxes: Rieder v. Rogan, 12 F. Supp. 307 (S. D.
Cal. 1935); Meridian Grain & Elevator Co. v. Fly, 12 F. Supp. 64 IS. D. Miss. 1935).
11. See 5 POM1EROY, EQU'ITY JURISPRL'P.CtE (1918) §2005.
12. See (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. Si0, 5o2.
13. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U. S. 510 (1925).
Perhaps an exception will also be made in the case of civil rights. American Steel
& Wire Co. of N. J. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (D. Ohio 1919); see Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U. S. 197, 216 (1923).
14. 'Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 (1913); Davis v. Fosnig. 128 Ind.
271, 27 N. E. 726 (1891).
15. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908): Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923).
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to be sued without its consent"; and that equitable relief should be denied
since the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law in his defense to the
criminal prosecution. 7 There are two considerations which seem mainly
to limit equity jurisdiction in this field: one is an unwillingness to inter-
fere too directly with police administration,'8 the second, a reluctance to
permit in a non-criniual proceeding a trial of facts pertinent to criminal
responsibility without the traditional safeguards of the criminal law.' 9
The only persuasive argument against the granting of injunctions in these
cases is the one based upon the policy which is said to require that equity
should not impede criminal law enforcement. Sovereign immunity from suit
should not bar equitable relief; for it is settled that a public official does not
represent the state when he acts either without authority or with apparent
authority, but under an invalid statute.2 0 Nor can it be maintained that the
remedy at law is adequate: for even though acquitted, an individual may
find that the uncertainties raised by the criminal prosecution have been suffi-
cient to mar his reputation and endanger his business enterprise.2'1 Conse-
quently, a speedy adjudication on legality in a civil forum appears to him
far more sensible and practical than either subjecting himself to the rigors
of a prosecution 8r, in the alternative, foregoing the exercise of his rights.
And finally, the argument that the issue of criminal guilt or innocence should
16. Purity Oats Co. v. State, 125 Kan. 558, 264 Pac. 740 (1928) ; cf. Fitts v. McGhee,
172 U.S. 516 (1899).
17. Royal Farms Dairy v. Wallace. 7 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1934) ; Book Binders'
Trade Ass'n., Inc. v. Book Manufacturers' Institute, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 847 (S. D. N.Y.
1934), noted in (1935) 3 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 248; Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of
Elgin. 284 I1. 389, 120 N. E. 248 (1918) ; Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W.
552 (1933) and cases cited therein: see also cases cited in Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1219.
But under many declaratory judgment acts the availability of another remedy is
immaterial, see, i.e., Sec. 1 of the federal act, 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1934);
In New York. however. the declaratory judgment is discretionary in that the court
may withhold declaratory relief if it believes that the parties should be left to existing
remedies, CIV. PRAC. ACT § 473. CIV. PRAC. RULE 212. Connecticut has a similar dis-
cretionary rule. Cox-x. PRACTICE BOOK (1934) §250(c).
18. E.r parte State e.x tel. Martin. 200 Ala. 15, 75 So. 327 (1917) ; Joyner v. Ham-
mond. 199 Iowa 919. 200 N. W. 571 (1924) ; Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y. 323, 76 N. E.
209 (1906); Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore. 201 App. Div. 242. 194 N. Y. Supp. 225
(4th Dep't 1922) : Kelly v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S. W. 622 (1909).
19. Delaney v. Flood. 183 N. Y. 323, 76 N. E. 209 (1906) ; Kelly v. Conner, 122
Tenn. 339. 123 S. AV. 622 (1909) : zee (1932) 31 Micii. L. REV. 128; cf. Dreiser v.
Lane Co., 183 App. Div. 773. 171 N.Y. Supp. 605 (1st Dep't 1918) ; Lyttle v. Valen-
Jie. 160 Misc. 355, 290 N. Y. Supp. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
20. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); Ex pare Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908) ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Greene v. Louisville
I. R. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1917).
21. See (1927) 25 MicH. L. Rv. 892, 896; (1931) 6 WASH. L. REV. 131, 134.
Moreover, under most declaratory judgment acts the adequacy or inadequacy of legal
remedies is immaterial. Sce POR.HARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 138.
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be confined to a criminal court, with its historic safeguards for the accused,
is not persuasive when applied to suits for injunctions. Injunctions are
sought voluntarily by those persons for whose protection the safeguards of
the criminal are urged; the facts involved in these suits are usually either
quite simple or even undisputed; and an adjudication that there has been
a violation of the criminal law results in a penalty no more serious than the
dismissal of the bill.2 The belief, however, that an injunction may unduly
interfere with the activities of the police appears well-founded. Although an
injunction will restrain the police from proceeding only. where they lack
probable cause or do not act in good faith, the threat of a possible citation
for contempt for violating the injunction may deter authorities from insti-
tuting criminal proceedings made proper by a change in circumstances fol-
lowing the issuance of the injunction. -2 3
When the police have threatened a business man with prosecution and
he seeks a declaration that his business or his way of conducting it is privi-
leged, a different situation is presented. A declaration against the police is
hardly effective to throttle their efforts*if they suspect a change in circum-
stances has rendered the declaration inapplicable. If they do prosecute and
if it is held that the prosecution was unjustified, in view of the declaration,
there will be no citation for contempt; for if the prosecution fails .to uncover
facts which were not brought out in the suit for the declaration, that declar-
ation will be res adjudicata on the innocence of the accused,2 4 and the only
penalty imposed upon over-zealous police is the effort wasted in their un-
successful prosecution. But as the police themselves are often doubtful, the
decision, on the initiative of the threatened citizen, serves the same purpose
as would a criminal prosecution. Hence a prosecution is unlikely.
The declaratory judgment is a comparatively new remedy in the United
States and it seems inadvisable to confuse its development by surrounding
22. A finding of illegality in a civil court should have no bearing on the trial of
the same issue in a criminal court; for in criminal proceedings guilt must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in a civil action a fair preponderance of evidence
is sufficient. Because of this difference in measure of proof a civil court's finding of
facts constituting illegality can have no bearing on the same issue in a criminal court.
State v. Bradnack, 69 Conn. 212 (1897); Riker v. Hooper, 35 Vt. 457 (1862); see
2 FREEM.Ax, JUDGMENTs (5th ed. 1925) § 656. Even where the facts are stipulated in
the civil action, the court's finding of illegality on the basis of law could result in no
criminal penalties; for even in criminal law an adverse decision on a demurrer does
not generally operate as a conviction. See CLARK, CRPMAL PROc.Dznu (2nd ed.
1918) 427, 437.
23. See (1927) 25 MIcE. L. REv. 892, 896.
24. No cases have been found holding a civil court's adjudication of legality rex
adiudicata on the same matter in a criminal court. If, however, the criminal prosecu-
tion were based upon substantially the same facts as those previously found in the civil
trial, it would appear either that the prosecution should be dismissed, or, if it had pro-
ceeded to conviction, the conviction reversed on the ground of res adjudicata.
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its application with the detailed rules which limit the availability of injunc-
tions against criminal prosecutions. It can hardly be maintained that a
declaration that certain activities are legal unduly interferes with the ad-
ministration of the criminal law. On the contrary, where the facts are either
simple or undisputed, as they normally are in these suits, the declaration
will provide a more efficient administration of the criminal law without
preventing the police from prosecuting should they have good cause to believe
that subsequent events make prosecution proper. The alleged adequacy of
a remedy at law in the guise of a defense to the criminal prosecution should
have no relevance to the declaratory judgment 2 5 and the other arguments
urged in support of the rule that equity should not enjoin criminal prose-
cution are even less persuasive when applied to the declaratory judgment
than to the injunction.
The processes of the criminal law, designed to provide safeguards for
the individual against governmental oppression, have become too crystal-
lized to permit the flexibility that has been increasingly demanded; and
effective competition of alternative procedures is encroaching upon the juris-
diction of the traditional criminal law. Juvenile courts, administrative tribu-
nals, and licensing authorities have in recent decades increasingly supplanted
criminal prosecution in their respective fields.20 In the area of criminal law
where it can be invoked, the declaratory judgment provides another technique
for simplification and reform of the criminal law.
In denying declaratory judgments in these cases the New York courts
are preventing a speedy adjudication of rights and remitting the parties to
a less efficient procedure. The fact that the two New York cases involved
activities whose legality was doubtful under gambling statutes should not
be a reason for refusing a declaration: for it can hardly be said that those
activities so violated fundamental canons of propriety that the courts should
decline to pass upon their legality unless the issue is forced upon them in
an appeal from a conviction.2 7 Other courts have granted declaratory relief
in suits of a criminal "-' or quasi-criminal2 9) nature, and the grounds given
25. See BORCIIARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 138.
26. See Warner and Cabot. Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice
During the Past Fifty Years (1937) 50 HARV. L. REv. 583, 609-615.
27. Where the alleged offense runs violently counter to established communal mores,
courts are not likely by means of a declaratory judgment to aid a party to discover a
method for evading the letter of such a statute. Cf. Green v. Hart, 41 F. (2d) 855
(D. Conn. 1930); White v. Hesse, 48 F. (2d) 1018 (Ct. of Appeals, D. C. 1931);
Triangle Mint Corp. v. Mulrooney. 257 N.Y. 200 (1931); Times Amusement Corp.
v. Moss, (Sup. Ct. 1936) N. Y. L. J., Feb. 5, 1936, p. 655, col. 5.
28. See cases cited supra note 1 and in addition the following injunction cases
which in effect granted declaratory relief in criminal cases: Ashcraft v. Healey, 23 F.
(2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) ; Chambers v. Bachtel. 55 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932) ; Boynton v. Ellis, 57 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 10th. 1932) ; Davies v. Mills Novelty
Co., 70 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934): Durant v. Bennett, 54 F. (2d) 634 (W. D.
S.C. 1931); Mills Novelty Co. v. Farrell, 3 F. Supp. 555 (D. Conn. 1933) ; Mills
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in the two New York cases denying the declaration are not persuasive.
While the restriction announced in those two cases may he criticized as
too broad, sound discretion"0 may occasionally dictate the denial of relief
where a declaratory judgment will not terminate the issue and will, therefore,
serve no useful purpose.3 This situation may be presented where the facts
are either so complicated, 32 so disputed,33 or so readily subject to change
as to provide no assured basis for declarations upon which the parties may
rely with a reasonable degree of certainty. Such flexibility in factual back-
ground might have been made the basis of the result in the first New York
case involving a slot machine consisting of a small crane; for the rear-
rangement of a few levers might conceivably have transformed a legal game
of skill into an illegal game of chance.
34
Novelty Co. v. Bolan, 3 F. Supp. 968 (E. D. N.Y. 1933); Pure Mint Co. v. La Barre,
96 N. J. Eq. 186, 125 Att. 105 (1924) ; In Matter of Shapiro, 245 App. Div. 835 (2nd
Dep't 1935); Constantine v. City of New York, 116 Misc. 349, 190 N. Y. Supp. 372
(Sup. Ct. 1921).
29. See cases cited supra note 2.
30. The granting or withholding of a declaratory judgment rests in the sound
judicial discretion of the court. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. RULE 212; Automobile Equipment
Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 11 F. Supp. 292 (V. D. N.Y. 1935); James v. Alderton
Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931); see (1932) 32 CoL L. Rzv. 536, 537.
31. See Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment in the United States (1931) 37 V.
VA. L. Q. 127, 139.
32. Declaratory judgments are more suited to cases where the facts are simple.
See New Discoveries v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 596.
599 (W. D. Wis. 1936); see Borchard, Comment (1932) 41 YAL L. J. 1195, 1203.
33. See James v. Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd., 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401, 402
(1931); Lyttle v. Valentine, 160 Misc. 355, 290 N. Y. Supp. 11, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
34. In an unpublished opinion in the trial court Mr. Justice' Steuer said: "What
is a clear legal right is not as clear as the phrase, but I take it to mean that the
machine must be of such a character that it cannot possibly be operated to violate any
section of the Penal Law." (reported in Lyttle v. Valentine, 160 Misc. 355, 353, 2 0
N.Y. Supp. 11, 15 [Sup. Ct. 1936]). Apparently the two appellate courts were con-
vinced that the machine could readily be converted into an illegal gambling device.
